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SPENCER V. RAYBURN
CITY OF SPENCER v. RAYBURN: OKLAHOMA
PROPERTY VOTER RESTRICTION IN ELECTION TO
APPROVE MUNICIPAL BONDS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In City of Spencer v. Rayburn,' the Oklahoma Supreme
Court considered the validity of Art. 10, § 27, of the Oklahoma
Constitution which permits only qualified property-taxpay-
ing citizens to vote in elections to approve the issuance of
municipal obligation bonds. 2
In an original action before the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
the City of Spencer sought a Writ of Mandamus to compel
its Mayor, layburn, to hold a special election in order to ap-
prove the issuance of general obligation bonds as authorized
by Art. 10, § 27, of the Oklahoma Constitution. The City Coun-
cil had previously adopted a resolution directing its Mayor
to submit to the qualified voters for their approval municipal
1 483 P.2d 735 (Okla. 1971).
2 OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 27 provides in part:
Any incorporated city or town ... may, by a ma-
jority of the qualified property taxpaying voters
of such city or town, voting at an election to be
held for that purpose, be allowed to become in-
debted in a larger amount than . . . [the regular
5% constitutional debt limitation], for the purpose
of purchasing or constructing public utilities, or for
repairing the same, to be owned exclusively by
such city: Provided, that any such city or town
incurring any such indebtedness . . . shall provide
for the collection of an annual tax in addition to
the other taxes provided for by this Constitution,
sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness
as it fall due, and also to constitute a sinking fund,
for the payment of the principal thereof within
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bonds in the sum of $132,000.00 for the purpose of improving
and expanding the city water system. The Mayor refused on
the basis that the resolution called for submission of the prop-
osition to qualified voters; whereas, Art. 10, § 27 specifies sub-
mission to qualified property taxpaying voters of the City.
Consequently, the City of Spencer sought a Writ of Manda-
mus, challenging the validity of Art. 10, § 27, by asserting
this provision violated the "equal protection clause" of the
fourteenth amendment by disenfranchising otherwise qualified
voters who are not property taxpayers.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court had previously
upheld the State's right to restrict to property taxpayers the
vote in elections to approve the issuance of general obliga-
tion bonds,3 the plaintiff contended that the recent U. S.
Supreme Court decision in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski4
required the State Supreme Court to reverse its position and
declare the voter restriction in Art. 10, § 27 unconstitutional.
Therefore, a thorough examination of Phoenix is essential in
order to properly evaluate the decision rendered by the Okla-
homa Supreme Court.
The Phoenix case also involved the constitutionality of
state laws designed to deny otherwise qualified voters who
own no real property the right to vote in elections to approve
the issuance of general obligation bonds to be used in fi-
nancing municipal improvements.5 The City of Phoenix, Ari-
zona held an election on June 10, 1969, to authorize the is-
sue of $60,450,000 in general obligation bonds. According to
Arizona law, ad valorem taxes were to be levied to service
8 Settle v. City of Muskogee, 462 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1969).
4 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
5 ARiz. CONST. art. 7, § 13, art. 9, § 8; ARiz. REV. STAT. A-' .
§§ 35-452 (1956), 35-455 (Supp. 1971); Law of March 9,
1943, ch. 31, § 4, [1943] Ariz. Laws 73 (amended in 1970
to reflect the Phoenix decision, now ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-523 (Supp. 1971)).
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the indebtedness, although the City was legally entitled to
use other revenues for this purpose.0 The bonds were sub-
sequently approved in an election wherein only real property
taxpayers were permitted to vote. On August 1, 1969, Ko-
lodziejski, a qualified voter who owned no real property, filed
suit in the United States Court for the District of Arizona
challenging the constitutionality of the restricted franchise in
Arizona bond elections and attacking the validity of the elec-
tion approving the Phoenix bonds. A three-judge district court
held this exclusion of nonproperty-owning voters a vio-
lation of the Federal Constitution.7 The City of Phoenix ap-
pealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court which
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona Constitution
and statutes as applied to exclude nonproperty owners from
voting in elections to approve general obligation bonds vio-
lated the "equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court relied
on two earlier cases, Kramer v. Union Free School District
and Cipriano v. City of Houma.9 Discussing Kramer the
Phoenix Court maintained Kramer held:
[A] State could not restrict the vote in school dis-
trict elections to owners and lessees of real property
and parents of school children because the exclusion
of otherwise qualified voters was not shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling state interest.10
This announced principle, by its terms applicable to elections
of public officials, was extended to elections for the approval
of revenue bonds to finance local improvements in Cipriano
v. City of Houma. n'
6 399 U.S. at 205 n. 1.
7 313 F. Supp. 209 (D. Ariz. 1969).
8 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
9 395 U.S. 701 (1969).10 City of Phoenix v Kolodziejsld, 399 U.S. 204, 205 (1970).
11 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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I The Cipriano case involved a successful challenge to the
constitutionality of Louisiana voter restrictions which allow-
ed only property taxpayers to vote in elections called to ap-
prove municipal utility revenue bonds.12 The United States
Supreme Court in Cipriano stated that the Louisiana restric-
tion did not meet the ". . . exacting standard of precision
we require of statutes which selectively distribute the fran-
chise." 3 The Cipriano Court referred to its decision in
Kramer and declared that the constitutionality of the Louisi-
ana voter restriction depended on "whether all those exclud-
ed [were] in fact substantially less interested or affected than
those the statute include[d]." 4 Since all customers of the
utility system pay utility bills and their rates could be "sub-
stantially affected" by the amount of revenue bond indebted-
ness, the Court stated:
[P]roperty owners are not alone in feeling the im-
pact of bad utility service or high rates, or in reap-
ing the benefits of good service and low rates.
The revenue bonds are to be paid only from the
operations of the utilities; they are not financed in
any way by property tax revenues. Property owners,
like nonproperty owners, use the utilities and pay
the rates; however, the impact of the revenue bond
issue on them is unconnected to their status as prop-
erty taxpayers.15
The Court determined in Cipriano that those excluded
by the classification were clearly as interested and affected
12 LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:501, 39:508 (1950); § 33:4258 (Supp.
1971). These statutes authorize Louisiana municipalities to
issue revenue bonds, but only if they are approved by a
"majority in number and amount of the property taxpay-
ers qualified to vote ... [who voted in the bond election]."
LA. REV. STAT. §39:501 (1950).
13 395 U.S. at 706, quoting, Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
14 395 U.S. at 704, quoting, 395 U.S. at 632.
15 395 U.S. at 705.
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as those included. And since the voting classification was
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's declared
objective -limiting the franchise to those voters who had
a special interest in the election-the restrictions were un-
constitutional because there was no compelling state interest
to be served by enforcing the restrictions. For this reason,
the Court concluded that the denial of the franchise to non-
property owners in an election regarding revenue bonds was
an abridgement of their fourteenth amendment rights.
The issue in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski then became:
Whether the Federal Constitution requires the extension of
the "Cipriano Doctrine" regarding revenue bonds to elec-
tions involving the approval of general obligation bonds? The
City of Phoenix argued that the Cipriano rationale did not
apply and therefore did not render unconstitutional the ex-
clusion of nonproperty owners-that the restricted voting
franchise was valid because of the compelling state interests
involved.' 6 The City based this argument on two basic prem-
ises: First, the Arizona law placed a special burden on prop-
erty owners since it required the levying of property taxes
in an amount sufficient to pay the interest and principal on
general obligation bonds.17 Second, the City emphasized the
servicing distinction between revenue bonds such as were
involved in the Cipriano case and general obligation bonds
as approved by the property taxpayers in Phoenix. Revenue
bonds are serviced entirely from funds derived from both
property and nonproperty owners alike because revenue
bonds are secured by income from the operation of the par-
ticular facility financed by the bonds. In contrast, ad va-
lorem taxes are principally used to service general obliga-
tion bonds, which are secured by the taxing power of the
municipality. Therefore, the City of Phoenix contended that
general obligation bonds act as a lien on all real property
subject to taxation by the municipality, and consequently
16 399 U.S. at 207-8.
17 See note 6 Supra.
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the ". . . State is justified in recognizing the unique inter-
ests of real property owners by allowing only property tax-
payers to participate in elections to approve the issuance of
general obligation bonds."' 8
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument
and in so doing stressed the following reasons for the conclu-
sion that the "differences between the interests of property
owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not suffi-
ciently substantial to justify excluding the latter from the fran-
chise."'19 First, all citizens of Phoenix have a substantial in-
terest in the services which the City has to provide and thus
are substantially affected by the bond election. In addition,
the Court emphasized that giving the right to vote solely to
property owners can be justified only by some "overriding
interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recog-
nize."20 The Court felt this test had not been met. Secondly,
although the laws of Arizona call for an ad valorem tax to
service the general obligation bonds, revenues from other
sources can be utilized for this purpose. "[lit is anticipated
with respect to the instant bonds, as has been true in the
past, that more than half of the debt service requirements
will be satisfied not from real property taxes but from reve-
nues from other local taxes paid by nonproperty owners as
well as those who own real property."21 Therefore, all citizens
will contribute directly to the servicing of the bonds by the
payment of taxes for this purpose. Thirdly, even if the gen-
eral obligation bonds were serviced entirely by property own-
ers paying ad valorem taxes, the disenfranchisement of non-
property owners would not be justified. The Court stated:
Property taxes may be paid initially by property
owners, but a significant part of the ultimate burden
18 399 U.S. at 208.
19 Id. at 209.
20 Id. at 209.
21 Id. at 209-10.
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6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 7 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol7/iss2/6
SPENCER V. RAYBURN
of each year's tax on rental property will very likely
be borne by the tenant rather than the landlord ...
[T]he landlord will treat the property tax as a busi-
ness expense and normally will be able to pass all
or a large part of this cost on to the tenants in the
form of higher rent. . . . Moreover, property taxes
on commercial property ... will be treated as a cost
of doing business and will normally be reflected in
the prices of goods and services purchased by non-
property owners and property owners alike.22
For these reasons, the Court determined that the challenged
provisions of the Arizona Constitution and statutes violated
the "equal protection clause" of the Federal Constitution. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
[A]lthough owners of real property have interests
somewhat different from the interests of nonproperty
owners in the issuance of general obligation bonds,
there is no basis for concluding that nonproperty
owners are substantially less interested in the is-
suance of these securities than are property owners.2
Justice Stewart, dissenting, agreed with the holding in
Cipriano because there "the State had created a wholly ir-
relevant voting classification."24 However, he strongly dis-
sented with the majority opinion because the Majority was
not concerned in Phoenix with "income producing utilities
that can pay for themselves, but with municipal improve-
ments that must be paid for by the taxpayers."25 Because
22 Id. at 210-11. It should be noted that how successful the
landlord will be in "passing on" the additional property
tax to the tenant depends upon how responsive the demand
for rental property is to changes in rent levels. Many other
economic factors beyond the scope of this article should be
considered in determining the validity of this argument.
See, R. Netzer, EcoNoivics OF Tm PROPERTY TAX 32-40 (1966).
2 399 U.S. at 212.
24 Id. at 216 (dissenting opinion).
25 Id. at 2174
1971]
7
Waters: City of Spencer v. Rayburn: Oklahoma Property Voter Restriction i
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1971
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the indebtedness created by the general obligation bonds
operates during the lifetime of the bonds as a lien on all
taxable property, Justice Stewart argued, the exclusion of
nonproperty owners is an entirely rational public policy and
not the "invidious discrimination that the equal protection
clause condemns."26
This writer believes the reasoning employed by Justice
Stewart is sound and strongly disagrees with the Court's ex-
tension of the "Cipriano Doctrine" to elections involving gen-
eral obligation bonds. Although Arizona restricted voting on
municipal utility bond indebtedness, this exclusion of non-
property owners was made on the basis of who was "primari-
ly interested in or affected by" the election. The historical
idea that property ownership is directly related to voter com-
petence is no longer accepted by the Supreme Court.-7 How-
ever, the City's argument in Phoenix was not that property
owners were better qualified to vote, but that they, as a class,
had a substantially larger interest in the election than did
those not owning real property. Although their general in-
terest in public improvements may not be any greater, their
pecuniary interest in the bond issue is substantially greater
than that of the property taxpayers in Cipriano. The prop-
erty taxpayers in Arizona are directly responsible for the
cost of the bonds through additional ad valorem taxes; where-
as, the property taxpayers in Cipriano pay for revenue bonds
only as users of the public improvement at the same rate as
do nonproperty owners. The Court argued in Phoenix that
this distinction is invalid because property owners pass on
the affect of higher ad valorem taxes to lessees and consum-
ers, and in this manner nonproperty owners *share the ex-
pense of the general obligation bonds. The question arises as
to the extent the additional ad valorem tax is "passed on"?
26 Id. at 218.
27 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668
(1966). -.. 'A
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In absense of positive proof that a significant portion of the
higher property tax is passed on to the tenant and consumer,
the Court failed, in this writer's opinion, to demonstrate a
need for extending the principles established by Cipriano.
Nevertheless, Phoenix indicates that all states having pro-
visions requiring property ownership as a basis for voter
qualification in elections to approve the issuance of general
obligation bonds are in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment.29 Therefore, the central issue in the Oklahoma case,
City of Spencer v. Rayburn, was whether Phoenix rendered
inoperable Article 10, Section 27 of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion insofar as it permits only property taxpayers to vote
in general obligation bond elections? Although the Oklahoma
Supreme Court on several previous occasions had declared
Section 27 to be within the spirit of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment,30 the court applied Phoenix
and in a unanimous decision held the voter limitation un-
constitutional.
The Spencer case represents not only a significant and
complete reversal of the court's attitude,31 but brings the
20 It should be noted that the Court in Phoenix specifically
named 12 states besides Arizona which restrict the fran-
chise to property taxpayers in varying degrees in general
obligation bond elections. Oklahoma was one of the states.
By inference, was the Court suggesting that these state
statutes were unconstitutional? 399 U.S. 213 n.11.
30 Settle v. City of Muskogee, 462 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1969),
Settle v. Board of Co. Comr's of Co. of Muskogee, 462
P.2d 646 (Okla. 1969).
31 This change in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's attitude
is reflected by the withdrawn opinion in Beauchamp v.
Oklahoma City, 41 OKLA. B.A.J. 2215 (Oct. 10, 1970), where-
in the court refused to apply Phoenix by factually distlm-
guishing Section 27 from the analogous provisions of the
Arizona Constitution and statutes. Realizing either their
tremendous error in judgment, or else due to mounting
pressure from bond buyers and city officials, the court
withdrew this opinion and in another decision upheld an
19711
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state constitution into harmony with the Phoenix mandate.
The constitutional question of the restricted voting francise
in Oklahoma has finally been resolved, removing the doubt
and uncertainty of bond buyers, public officials, and concern-
ed citizens.
Charles L. Waters.
Oklahoma City bond election on the basis that Oklahoma
has no well-defined period for challenging general obliga-
tion bond elections within the meaning of the Phoenix
case. 41 OKLA. B.A.J. 2317 (1970). The question, therefore,
of the validity of the restricted franchise was left unre-
solved.
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